This paper uses laboratory experiments to directly test a central prediction of disclosure theory: that strategic forces can lead those who possess private information to voluntarily provide it. In a simple sender-receiver game, we find that senders disclose favorable information, but withhold unfavorable information. The degree to which senders withhold information is strongly related to their stated beliefs about receiver actions, and their stated beliefs are accurate on average. Receiver actions are also strongly related to their stated beliefs, but their actions and beliefs suggest that many are insufficiently skeptical about nondisclosed information in the absence of repeated feedback. (JEL C70, D82, D83)

中文翻译：

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没有新闻（被认为是）坏消息吗？信息披露的实验研究

本文通过实验室实验直接检验了披露理论的一个核心预测：战略力量可以引导拥有私人信息的人自愿提供信息。在一个简单的发送者-接收者博弈中，我们发现发送者披露了有利信息，但隐瞒了不利信息。发送者隐瞒信息的程度与他们对接收者行为的陈述信念密切相关，并且他们陈述的信念平均而言是准确的。接收者的行为也与他们陈述的信念密切相关，但他们的行为和信念表明，在没有重复反馈的情况下，许多人对未公开信息的怀疑不足。(JEL C70, D82, D83)