We study a continuous-time organization design problem. Each member’s output is an imperfect signal of his underlying effort, and each member’s utility from remaining in the organization is endogenous to other members’ efforts. Monetary transfers are assumed infeasible. Incentives can be provided only through two channels: expulsion following poor performance and respite following good performance. We derive the steady state distribution of members’ continuation utilities for arbitrary values of the initial and maximum continuation utilities and then optimize these values according to organizational objectives. An optimally designed organization can be implemented by associating continuation utilities with a performance-tracking reputation system. (JEL Z13, D23, D86, P13, D82)

中文翻译：

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社区、合作社和俱乐部：大型集体组织中的社会资本和激励措施

我们研究一个连续时间的组织设计问题。每个成员的输出是他潜在努力的不完美信号，每个成员留在组织中的效用是内生于其他成员的努力。假定货币转移是不可行的。激励措施只能通过两个渠道提供：表现不佳后开除和表现良好后暂缓。我们针对初始和最大持续效用的任意值推导出成员持续效用的稳态分布，然后根据组织目标优化这些值。可以通过将延续实用程序与绩效跟踪信誉系统相关联来实现优化设计的组织。(JEL Z13, D23, D86, P13, D82)