In markets with asymmetric information, where equilibria are often inefficient, bargaining can help promote welfare. We design an experiment to examine the impact of competition and price transparency in such settings. Consistent with the theoretical predictions, we find that competition promotes efficiency if bargainers cannot observe each other’s price offers. Contrary to the predictions, however, the efficiency-enhancing effect of competition persists even when offers are observable. We explore different behavioral explanations for the absence of a detrimental effect of price transparency. Remarkably, implementing the strategy method improves subjects’ conditional reasoning, delivering the predicted loss in efficiency when offers are observable. (JEL C78, D82, L15)

中文翻译：

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柠檬市场的竞争和价格透明度：实验证据

在信息不对称的市场中，均衡往往效率低下，讨价还价有助于促进福利。我们设计了一个实验来检查这种环境下竞争和价格透明度的影响。与理论预测一致，我们发现如果讨价还价者不能观察彼此的报价，竞争会提高效率。然而，与预测相反，即使可以观察到报价，竞争的效率提升效果仍然存在。我们探讨了价格透明度不存在不利影响的不同行为解释。值得注意的是，实施策略方法可以提高受试者的条件推理能力，在可观察到报价时提供预期的效率损失。(JEL C78, D82, L15)