We introduce noisy belief equilibrium (NBE) for normal-form games in which players best respond to noisy belief realizations. Axioms restrict belief distributions to be unbiased with respect to and responsive to changes in the opponents’ behavior. The axioms impose testable restrictions both within and across games, and we compare these restrictions to those of regular quantal response equilibrium (QRE) in which axioms are placed on the quantal response function as the primitive. NBE can generate similar predictions as QRE in several classes of games. Unlike QRE, NBE is a refinement of rationalizability and invariant to affine transformations of payoffs. (JEL C72, D83, D91)

中文翻译：

---

随机均衡：行动或信念中的噪音？

我们为正常形式的游戏引入了嘈杂的信念均衡（NBE），其中玩家对嘈杂的信念实现做出最好的反应。公理将信念分布限制为对对手行为的变化无偏见并对其做出反应。公理在博弈内和博弈之间施加了可测试的限制，我们将这些限制与常规量子响应平衡 (QRE) 的限制进行比较，其中公理作为原语放在量子响应函数上。NBE 可以在几类游戏中生成与 QRE 类似的预测。与 QRE 不同，NBE 是对合理化和收益仿射变换不变性的改进。(JEL C72, D83, D91)