A large literature examines demand-side barriers to product adoption. In this paper, we examine supply-side barriers in a setting with limited contract enforcement. We model the relationship between a distributor and its credit-constrained vendors. We show that the optimal self-enforcing arrangement can be implemented by providing vendors with a line of credit and the option to buy additional units at a fixed price. Moreover, the structure of this arrangement is optimal both for profit-maximizing firms and for nonprofit organizations with limited resources. We test the arrangement using a field experiment in rural Uganda. We find that the model-implied optimal arrangement increased distribution significantly compared to a standard contract. However, growth was lower than predicted by the model because vendors were unwilling to extend credit to customers and did not have access to a reliable savings technology. We discuss several recent technological innovations that help to overcome both of these challenges. (JEL C93, D86, G31, L14, L26, L31, O14)

中文翻译：

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发展中市场的最佳分销安排：理论与证据

大量文献研究了产品采用的需求侧障碍。在本文中，我们研究了合同执行有限的情况下的供应方障碍。我们对分销商与其信用受限的供应商之间的关系进行建模。我们表明，可以通过向供应商提供信用额度和以固定价格购买额外单位的选项来实现最佳的自我执行安排。此外，这种安排的结构对于利润最大化的公司和资源有限的非营利组织都是最优的。我们使用乌干达农村的实地实验来测试这种安排。我们发现，与标准合同相比，模型隐含的最优安排显着增加了分配。然而，增长低于模型的预测，因为供应商不愿向客户提供信贷，也无法获得可靠的储蓄技术。我们讨论了一些有助于克服这两个挑战的最新技术创新。（JEL C93、D86、G31、L14、L26、L31、O14）