We investigate information aggregation and competition in a delegation framework. An uninformed principal is unable to perform a task herself and must choose between one of two biased and imperfectly informed experts. In the focal equilibrium, experts exaggerate their biases, anticipating an ideological winner’s curse. We show that having a second expert can benefit the principal, even when equally or more biased than the first expert. The principal can benefit from commitment to an “element of surprise” and prefers experts with equal rather than opposite biases. (JEL D82, D83)

中文翻译：

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基于委托的专业知识理论

我们在委托框架中调查信息聚合和竞争。不知情的校长自己无法执行任务，必须在两名有偏见且不完全知情的专家中进行选择。在焦点均衡中，专家们夸大了他们的偏见，期待意识形态赢家的诅咒。我们表明，拥有第二位专家可以使委托人受益，即使与第一位专家的偏见相同或更多。委托人可以从对“惊喜元素”的承诺中受益，并且更喜欢具有相同而不是相反偏见的专家。(JEL D82, D83)