We study relational contracts between a firm and a worker with mutual uncertainty about match quality. The worker’s actions are publicly observed and generate both output and information about the match quality. We show that the relational contracts may be inefficient. We characterize the inefficiency through a holdup problem on the contemporaneous output. In the frequent action limit, these inefficiencies persist if and only if information degrades at least at the same rate at which impatience vanishes. We characterize optimal relational contracts and show that they involve actions that yield both a lower payoff and less information than another action. (JEL D83, D86, J22, J31, J41, J63)

中文翻译：

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学习关系契约

我们研究了公司和工人之间的关系合同，在匹配质量方面存在相互不确定性。工人的行为是公开观察的，并产生有关匹配质量的输出和信息。我们表明关系契约可能是低效的。我们通过同时输出的滞留问题来描述效率低下。在频繁行动限制中，当且仅当信息至少以与不耐烦消失的速度相同的速度退化时，这些低效率才会持续存在。我们描述了最优关系合约，并表明它们涉及的行为与其他行为相比，产生的回报更低，信息也更少。(JEL D83、D86、J22、J31、J41、J63)