This paper takes Zahavi’s view to task that every conscious experience involves a “minimal sense of self.” Zahavi bases his claim on the observation that experience, even on the pre-reflective level, is not only about the object, but also has a distinctive qualitative aspect which is indicative of the fact that it is for me. It has the quality of what he calls “for-meness” or “mineness.” Against this I argue that there are not two phenomena but only one. On the pre-reflective level, experience is transparent. Conscious experience may well be reflexive (insofar as it is relation to me) but this does not imply that I additionally have a sense of what it is like for me to have that experience.

I do not just happen to disagree with Zahavi’s account of pre-reflective experience but, more importantly, I am concerned that he imposes it onto his interpretation of Edmund Husserl. Zahavi claims that when Husserl argues that consciousness is necessarily a form of self-consciousness, he must be committed to the view that we necessarily have a sense of ownership. However, Husserl only claims that I am self-conscious but not that I am a self that owns its consciousness. Zahavi thus misses the novelty of Husserl’s position, namely that I do not need to have a sense of abiding ownership, to have experience.

本文将 Zahavi 的观点作为任务，即每一个有意识的体验都包含一种“最小的自我意识”。扎哈维的主张是基于这样的观察，即经验，即使是在预反思的层面上，也不仅与对象有关，而且具有独特的定性方面，这表明它是为我而设的。它具有他所谓的“for-meness”或“mineness”的品质。与此相反，我认为不存在两种现象，而只有一种。在预反思的层面上，经验是透明的。有意识的体验很可能是反射性的（就它与我的关系而言），但这并不意味着我也对拥有这种体验的感觉有一种感觉。

我不只是碰巧不同意扎哈维对前反思经验的描述，更重要的是，我担心他将其强加于他对埃德蒙·胡塞尔的解释中。扎哈维声称，当胡塞尔认为意识必然是自我意识的一种形式时，他必须坚持这样一种观点，即我们必然有一种主人翁意识。然而，胡塞尔只声称我是有自我意识的，而不是说我是一个拥有它的意识的自我。扎哈维因此错过了胡塞尔立场的新颖性，即我不需要有一种持久的主人翁意识，也不需要有经验。