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Competing Claims and the Separateness of Persons
Philosophical Papers Pub Date : 2022-02-23 , DOI: 10.1080/05568641.2021.2015425
Jamie Hardy 1
Affiliation  

Abstract

I argue that the use of the separateness of persons in the debate between the priority view and the competing claims view is deeply flawed. In making the case, I argue for three points. First, that the actual argument against the priority view relies on intuitions about the worse off that has no connection to the separateness of persons. Second, that the competing claims view is derivative of Thomas Nagel’s pairwise comparison view. However, Nagel’s justification for pairwise comparisons is based on an interpretation of equality and not the separateness of persons. Third, I offer various interpretations of the separateness of persons and conclude that that the competing claims view violates most interpretations of the separateness of persons. Further, the one that is compatible with the competing claims view leads to the tyranny of the worst off.



中文翻译:

相互竞争的权利要求和人的分离

摘要

我认为,在优先权观点和竞争性主张观点之间的辩论中使用人员分离是有严重缺陷的。在论证过程中,我主张三点。首先,反对优先观点的实际论据依赖于对与个人分离无关的更糟情况的直觉。其次,竞争索赔观点是托马斯·内格尔的成对比较观点的派生。然而,内格尔对成对比较的解释是基于对平等的解释,而不是基于人的分离。第三,我提供了对人的分离性的各种解释,并得出结论认为,相互竞争的主张观点违反了对人的分离性的大多数解释。此外,与相互竞争的索赔观点兼容的观点导致了最坏境遇的暴政。

更新日期:2022-02-23
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