Research on firm-level corporate political activity often treats firm-government interactions as independent of the market competition between firms. Yet, firms that compete in the market will consider rivals when making strategic nonmarket decisions. Ignoring market rivalry when studying nonmarket strategy introduces fundamental endogeneity problems and potentially overlooks a central mechanism explaining firms’ political choices. Our study demonstrates this by investigating the strategic nonmarket interactions of large US tobacco manufacturers, a case study that is independently interesting. From 1992 to 2008, the US tobacco industry experienced dramatic upheaval in its business environment as regulatory authority shifted from the state to federal level, under the Food and Drug Administration. Using firm-candidate–cycle data, a complete information campaign contributions game, played in the nonmarket environment, is estimated for two of the United States’ largest tobacco manufacturers. Results demonstrate that, rather than acting in isolation, US tobacco firms strategically coordinated their firm-level political campaign contributions.

中文翻译：

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将企业政治活动与烟草业的证据进行互动

对公司层面的公司政治活动的研究通常将公司与政府的互动视为独立于公司之间的市场竞争。然而，在市场上竞争的公司在做出战略性非市场决策时会考虑竞争对手。在研究非市场战略时忽略市场竞争会引入基本的内生性问题，并可能忽略解释公司政治选择的中心机制。我们的研究通过调查美国大型烟草制造商的战略性非市场互动来证明这一点，这是一个独立有趣的案例研究。从 1992 年到 2008 年，随着监管机构从州转移到联邦一级，由食品和药物管理局管理，美国烟草业的商业环境发生了剧烈的变化。使用公司-候选人-周期数据，估计美国最大的两家烟草制造商在非市场环境中进行了一场完整的信息运动贡献游戏。结果表明，美国烟草公司不是孤立地行动，而是战略性地协调其公司层面的政治竞选捐款。