In cross-national studies, ethnic exclusion is robustly associated with the onset of violent challenge to incumbent regimes. But significant variation remains at the subnational level—not all members of an excluded ethnic group join in challenge. This article accounts for intra-ethnic group variation in terms of the network properties of local communities, nested within ethnic groups, and the informal ties that regimes forge to some segments of the ethnically excluded population. Mobilization within an excluded ethnic group is most likely among local communities where members are densely linked to one another and lack network access to state-controlled resources. Drawing on a case study of the Syrian city of Homs in the 2011 uprising, this article demonstrates how the Syrian regime’s strategies of managing the Sunni population of Homs shaped patterns of challenge. On the one hand, the state’s toleration of spontaneous settlements on the city’s periphery helped to reproduce dense network ties. On the other hand, the regime’s informal bargains with customary leaders instrumentalized those ties to manage local populations. These bargains could not withstand the regime’s use of violence against challengers, which meant that these same local networks became crucial factors in impelling and sustaining costly antiregime mobilization.

中文翻译：

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叙利亚城市的网络、非正式治理和种族暴力

在跨国研究中，种族排斥与对现任政权的暴力挑战密切相关。但在次国家层面仍存在显着差异——并非所有被排斥种族的成员都加入挑战。本文根据地方社区的网络属性、嵌套在族群中的网络属性以及政权与某些被种族排斥的人群建立的非正式联系来解释族群内的差异。在一个被排斥的族群内部动员最有可能发生在当地社区，那里的成员彼此紧密相连，并且缺乏对国家控制资源的网络访问。借鉴 2011 年起义中叙利亚霍姆斯市的案例研究，本文展示了叙利亚政权管理逊尼派霍姆斯人口的战略如何塑造了挑战模式。一方面，国家对城市周边自发定居点的容忍有助于再现密集的网络联系。另一方面，该政权与传统领导人的非正式讨价还价利用这些关系来管理当地人口。这些讨价还价无法抵挡政权对挑战者使用暴力，这意味着这些地方网络成为推动和维持代价高昂的反政权动员的关键因素。该政权与传统领导人的非正式交易利用这些联系来管理当地人口。这些讨价还价无法抵挡政权对挑战者使用暴力，这意味着这些地方网络成为推动和维持代价高昂的反政权动员的关键因素。该政权与传统领导人的非正式交易利用这些联系来管理当地人口。这些讨价还价无法抵挡政权对挑战者使用暴力，这意味着这些地方网络成为推动和维持代价高昂的反政权动员的关键因素。