In a recent paper, Michael Pardo argues that the epistemic property that is legally relevant is the one called Safety, rather than Sensitivity. In the process, he argues against our Sensitivity-related account of statistical evidence. Here we revisit these issues, partly in order to respond to Pardo, and partly in order to make general claims about legal epistemology. We clarify our account, we show how it adequately deals with counterexamples and other worries, we raise suspicions about Safety's value here, and we revisit our general skepticism about the role that epistemological considerations should play in determining legal policy.

中文翻译：

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敏感性、安全性和法律：对 PARDO 的答复

在最近的一篇论文中，迈克尔·帕多认为，与法律相关的认知属性是安全性，而不是敏感性。在此过程中，他反对我们对统计证据的敏感性相关说明。在这里，我们重新审视这些问题，部分是为了回应帕尔多，部分是为了对法律认识论提出一般性主张。我们澄清了我们的说法，展示了它如何充分处理反例和其他担忧，我们在这里提出了对安全价值的怀疑，并且我们重新审视了我们对认识论考虑在确定法律政策中应该发挥的作用的普遍怀疑。