I examine Spinoza's claim in the Metaphysical Thoughts (CM) that the attributes of God are only distinguished by a distinction of reason. I contend that for Spinoza essential attributes, such as Thought or Extension, cannot be distinguished by Francisco Suarez's distinction of reasoning reason, as Martin Lin (2019) suggests, nor can he be using Suárez’ distinction of reasoned reason for this purpose, as Yitzhak Melamed (2017) believes. Since reasoning reason and the distinction of reasoned reason are the only two kinds of rational distinction available to Spinoza, it follows that for him the distinction between God's essential attributes in the CM cannot be a distinction of reason. But I show that Spinoza is not mistakenly using Suarez's distinction in the CM. Rather, I argue, Spinoza consistently follows Suárez and uses reasoned reason to distinguish between God's necessary properties and not between God's essential attributes.

我研究了斯宾诺莎在《形而上学思想》（CM）中的主张，即上帝的属性只能通过理性的区别来区分。我认为，对于斯宾诺莎而言，诸如思想或外延之类的基本属性不能像 Martin Lin (2019) 所暗示的那样通过弗朗西斯科·苏亚雷斯的推理理性区分来区分，他也不能像伊扎克那样为此目的使用苏亚雷斯对理性理性的区分Melamed (2017) 认为。既然推理理性和理性理性的区别是斯宾诺莎唯一可用的两种理性区别，那么对他来说，在CM中上帝的本质属性之间的区别不能是理性的区别。但我表明斯宾诺莎并没有错误地使用苏亚雷斯在CM中的区别。相反，我认为，斯宾诺莎一贯遵循苏亚雷斯，并使用理性的理由来区分上帝的必要属性，而不是区分上帝的本质属性。