ABSTRACT

Do geopolitical orientations distinguish anti-Lukashenka protesters from non-protesters in Belarus? Employing data from an original online protest survey among 18+year-old citizens of Belarus residing in the country (MOBILISE 2020, n= 17,174) fielded 18August2020–29January2021, this paper compares protesters (n = 11,719) to non-protesters (n = 5,455) to better understand the dispositions that distinguish them. First, our logistic regression analysis finds robust evidence of polarization along geopolitical lines (with protesters preferring apro-EU and an anti-Russia orientation). Second, we show that pro-EU foreign policy preferences of protesters are neither temporally determined nor driven by the crisis, and are thus foundational among the positions held by anti-regime protesters. Third, we find that pro-EU and anti-Russia attitudes align with liberal democratic dispositions. Our study calls for the more systematic integration of foreign policy preferences into the comparative study of mobilization.

摘要

地缘政治方向是否将白俄罗斯的反卢卡申卡抗议者与非抗议者区分开来？本文利用 2020 年 8 月 18 日至 2021 年 1 月 29 日对居住在该国的 18 岁以上白俄罗斯公民（MOBILISE 2020，n = 17,174）进行的原始在线抗议调查数据，将抗议者（n = 11,719）与非抗议者（n = 5,455）以更好地理解区分它们的性格。首先，我们的逻辑回归分析发现了沿地缘政治路线两极分化的有力证据（抗议者更喜欢亲欧盟和反俄罗斯方向）。其次，我们表明抗议者的亲欧盟外交政策偏好既不是临时决定的，也不是由危机驱动的，因此是反政权抗议者所持立场的基础。第三，我们发现亲欧盟和反俄罗斯的态度与自由民主的倾向一致。我们的研究呼吁将外交政策偏好更系统地整合到动员的比较研究中。