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Self-organisation, (M, R)–systems and enactive cognitive science
Adaptive Behavior ( IF 1.6 ) Pub Date : 2022-02-23 , DOI: 10.1177/10597123211066155
Tomasz Korbak 1, 2
Affiliation  

The notion of self-organisation plays a major role in enactive cognitive science. In this paper, I review several formal models of self-organisation that various approaches in modern cognitive science rely upon. I then focus on Rosen’s account of self-organisation as closure to efficient cause and his argument that models of systems closed to efficient cause – (M, R) systems – are uncomputable. Despite being sometimes relied on by enactivists this argument is problematic it rests on assumptions unacceptable for enactivists: that living systems can be modelled as time-invariant and material-independent. I then argue that there exists a simple and philosophically appealing reparametrisation of (M, R)–systems that accounts for the temporal dimensions of life but renders Rosen’s argument invalid.



中文翻译:

自组织,(M,R)-系统和主动认知科学

自组织的概念在主动认知科学中起着重要作用。在本文中,我回顾了现代认知科学中各种方法所依赖的几种形式的自组织模型。然后,我将重点关注罗森关于自组织作为对有效原因的封闭的说明,以及他关于对有效原因封闭的系统模型——(MR)系统——是不可计算的论点。尽管行动者有时会依赖这一论点,但它是有问题的,它建立在行动者无法接受的假设之上:生命系统可以被建模为时间不变和材料独立的。然后我认为存在一个简单且具有哲学吸引力的重新参数化 ( M , R)——解释生命的时间维度但使罗森的论点无效的系统。

更新日期:2022-02-23
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