In this squib, I evaluate the contradiction analysis (Abrusán in Natural Language Semantics 19(3):257–321, 2011, in Weak island semantics, 2014) and the necessary infelicity analysis (Oshima in Washio et al. (eds.), New frontiers in artificial intelligence, 2007; Schwarz and Simonenko in Natural Language Semantics 26(3–4):253–279, 2018b) of factive islands in light of a pattern that has not been previously discussed in the literature: questions about propositions. I argue that while the necessary infelicity approach can straightforwardly explain the acceptability of this kind of question, the contradiction account undergenerates, since it wrongly predicts their ungrammaticality. I claim that this prediction follows from the assumption that the domain of quantification contains contraries. Therefore, the main contribution of this squib is the observation that such an assumption cannot play an explanatory role in accounting for factive islands.

在这个爆竹中，我评估了矛盾分析（Abrusán in Natural Language Semantics 19(3):257–321, 2011, in Weak island semantics, 2014）和必要的不合理分析（Oshima in Washio et al. (eds.),人工智能的新前沿，2007；Schwarz 和 Simonenko 在 Natural Language Semantics 26(3-4):253-279, 2018b) 中根据文献中先前未讨论过的模式：关于命题的问题。我认为，虽然必要的不合理性方法可以直接解释这类问题的可接受性，但矛盾的解释并不成立，因为它错误地预测了它们的不合语法性。我声称这个预测是基于量化领域包含相反的假设。所以，