The COVID-19 pandemic brought critical debates regarding private equity ownership of long-term care facilities to the forefront of political, legal, and social landscapes. Like many of the historical concerns about long-term care, these debates center around low quality patient care. While the concerns present important challenges to overcome, this note theorizes the kinds of organizational incentives that may provide opportunities to align patient quality care with the financial goals of private equity investing. After a discussion of the historical context of long term care facilities and the more recent trends towards for-profit and private equity ownership of these facilities (Parts II and III), I engage with value-based models as a starting point to consider organizational level incentive possibilities (Part IV). In Part V, I consider an organizational-level pay for performance model, a time-bound incentive structure, and investor-specific incentives as three distinct possibilities for addressing the patient care issues identified.

COVID-19 大流行将有关长期护理设施的私募股权所有权的批判性辩论带到了政治、法律和社会领域的前沿。像许多关于长期护理的历史问题一样，这些争论围绕着低质量的患者护理展开。虽然这些担忧提出了需要克服的重要挑战，但本说明将组织激励的种类推向了理论，这些激励措施可能提供机会，使患者质量护理与私募股权投资的财务目标保持一致。在讨论了长期护理设施的历史背景以及这些设施的营利性和私募股权所有权的最新趋势（第二部分和第三部分）之后，我使用基于价值的模型作为考虑组织层面的起点激励的可能性（第四部分）。在第五部分中，