I first clarify the idea that blameworthiness requires consciousness as the view that one can be blameworthy only for what is a response to a reason of which one is conscious. Next I develop the following argument: blameworthiness requires exercising control in a way distinctive of persons and doing this, in view of what it is to be a person, requires responding to a reason of which one is conscious. Then I defend this argument from an objection inspired by Arpaly and Schroeder according to which responding to moral reasons suffices for exercising control distinctive of persons.

中文翻译：

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可责备性、控制力和意识或意识要求及其论据

我首先澄清这样一个观点，即受责备需要有意识，因为一个人只能因为对一个有意识的原因的反应而受到责备。接下来我提出以下论点：可责备性要求以一种独特的方式进行控制，而这样做，鉴于作为一个人是什么，需要对一个人意识到的原因做出反应。然后，我为这一论点辩护，反对由 Arpaly 和 Schroeder 激发的反对意见，根据该反对意见，对道德理由的回应足以对人进行控制。