There is a question as to how already “sunk” costs enter into proportionality considerations. Lazar proposes the “Discount View,” in which the reasons to secure the goal progressively (with sunk costs) diminish in weight but not below a certain threshold. I argue that even if this happened, this would not solve the problem that motivates Lazar to reject the “Prospective View.” Moreover, the mechanism Lazar proposes to make reasons behave in this way does not exist: There are no rights-based reasons for pursuing the goal present in his paradigmatic example, only well-being-based reasons. This is implied by Lazar’s own description of the case as one of rights-infringement, which makes his position incoherent. Finally, the four arguments Lazar offers for these reasons’ progressively diminishing in force are inconclusive anyway.

中文翻译：

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拉扎尔谈“道德沉没成本”和“折扣观”

关于“沉没”成本如何纳入比例考虑存在一个问题。拉扎尔提出了“折扣观点”，在该观点中，逐步确保目标的理由（沉没成本）减少但不低于某个阈值。我认为，即使发生这种情况，也无法解决促使拉扎尔拒绝“前瞻性观点”的问题。此外，拉扎尔提出的使理由以这种方式表现的机制并不存在：追求他的典型例子中存在的目标没有基于权利的理由，只有基于福祉的理由。拉扎尔自己将该案描述为侵犯权利的案件之一暗示了这一点，这使得他的立场不连贯。最后，拉扎尔提出的四个论点是由于这些原因逐渐减弱的效力无论如何都没有定论。