ABSTRACT

This paper evaluate, in terms of simulated welfare loss, the cross-checking of a DSGE model’s loss function with a simple Taylor rule as a monetary policy framework for a central bank unable to commit to a target. We focus on Tunisia as an emerging economy with challenging characteristics for this technique, mainly high involuntary unemployment and an important informal sector. Our results confirm the effectiveness of this technique and the policy implication we derive is the superiority of cross-checking over discretion as an optimal monetary policy framework when the central bank is unable to commit to a target.

中文翻译：

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失业、非正规性和最优货币政策，交叉检查方法的评估

摘要

本文在模拟福利损失方面评估了 DSGE 模型的损失函数与简单的泰勒规则的交叉检查，作为中央银行无法承诺目标的货币政策框架。我们将突尼斯作为一个新兴经济体，对这项技术具有挑战性，主要是高非自愿失业率和重要的非正规部门。我们的结果证实了这种技术的有效性，我们得出的政策含义是，当中央银行无法承诺目标时，作为最佳货币政策框架的交叉检查优于自由裁量权。