I reconstruct the notion of significance [Sinnhaftigkeit] in the later Husserl, with attention to his conceptions of judgment and transcendental logic. My analysis is motivated by the idea that an account of significance can help to connect analytic, Anglo-American conceptions of meaning as a precise, law-governed phenomenon investigated via linguistic analysis and Continental European conceptions of meaning in a broader “existential” sense. I argue that Husserl’s later work points to a transcendental-logical conception of a founding level of significance [Sinnhaftigkeit] prior to language, and that this conception meets characteristically analytic demands for precision and governance by logical constraints. At the same time, since it is based in descriptions of perceptual intentionality at the level of essential possibility, it leaves room for an account of meaning as a partially undetermined phenomenon of lived experience, and not just of our language and concepts, and thereby meets the characteristically Continental demand to take at face value meaning’s vagueness and indeterminacy in everyday human life.

我重构了后期胡塞尔的意义概念[ Sinnhaftigkeit ]，关注他的判断和先验逻辑的概念。我的分析的动机是这样一种想法，即对意义的解释有助于将分析的、英美的意义概念作为一种精确的、受法律管辖的现象联系起来，通过语言分析和更广泛的“存在”意义上的欧洲大陆意义概念进行调查。我认为，胡塞尔后来的工作指向了一种关于意义的创始水平的先验逻辑概念[ Sinnhaftigkeit] 先于语言，并且这一概念满足了对精确性和通过逻辑约束进行治理的典型分析要求。同时，由于它是基于对本质可能性层面的感知意向性的描述，它为将意义解释为生活经验的部分未确定现象而不仅仅是我们的语言和概念留下了空间，从而满足欧陆特有的要求，即从表面上理解人类日常生活中意义的模糊性和不确定性。