Equity carve-outs and spin-offs generate listed subsidiaries that embrace conflicts of interests between controlling and minority shareholders. We find robust evidence that long-tenure managers tend to conduct these asset divestitures, especially when the divesting firm has a concentrated ownership structure. The result suggests that managers with the opportunity to extract private benefits establish entities that provide such opportunities. Meanwhile, large shareholders prevent managers from conducting these divestitures when they have sufficiently large cash flow rights. We find no evidence that firms launching listed subsidiaries achieve better financial outcomes than asset sell-off firms. Problematic entities in corporate governance further create such entities.

股权分拆和分拆产生的上市子公司包含控股股东和少数股东之间的利益冲突。我们发现强有力的证据表明长期管理人倾向于进行这些资产剥离，尤其是当剥离公司拥有集中的所有权结构时。结果表明，有机会获取私人利益的管理者建立了提供此类机会的实体。同时，当大股东拥有足够大的现金流权时，他们会阻止经理进行这些资产剥离。我们没有发现任何证据表明成立上市子公司的公司比资产抛售公司取得更好的财务成果。公司治理中存在问题的实体进一步产生了此类实体。