Abstract

In this paper, we set up a mixed duopoly competition model between state-owned and private firms in order to compare specific and ad valorem taxes. Assuming that the total output under specific and ad valorem taxation remains unchanged, we find that if the public firm is completely privatised, the output of the private firm under the two tax schemes will be the same. If the public firm is not completely privatised, the output of the the private firm under specific taxation will be greater than that under ad valorem taxation. If the private firm is a pure local one, the social benefits will be the same under the two tax schemes. However, if the private firm is a joint venture that involves domestic and foreign entities, social welfare under ad valorem taxation will be greater than that under specific taxation.

摘要

在本文中，我们建立了国有企业和私营企业之间的混合双头垄断竞争模型，以比较从价税和从价税。假设从量税和从价税下的总产出保持不变，我们发现如果上市公司完全私有化，则两种税收方案下私营公司的产出是相同的。如果上市公司没有完全私有化，私营公司在从量税下的产出将大于从价税下的产出。如果私营企业是纯本地企业，则两种税收计划下的社会福利相同。但是，如果私营企业是涉及国内外实体的合资企业，从价税的社会福利将大于从量税的社会福利。