We empirically study the role of assets held by women in the creation of household wealth using data from rural India. We design a streamlined model of intrahousehold project funding where moral hazard frictions between spouses and women's asset control are the main ingredients. As predicted by the model, the data show that household asset accumulation depends on women's asset control in a non-monotonic way. Results indicate no presence of multiple equilibrium poverty traps, but do show that exogenous negative shocks will trigger assets aggregation within households where both spouses are present. This resilience mechanism is, however, not found in female headed household as these households have a monotonic relationship between women's wealth control and asset creation. We thus argue that policies to support women's empowerment need to distinguish women based on their individual wealth levels and headship status to enhance household well-being in remote Indian communities.

中文翻译：

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印度农村的家庭内部道德风险摩擦和家庭贫困陷阱

我们使用来自印度农村的数据，实证研究了女性持有的资产在家庭财富创造中的作用。我们设计了一个简化的家庭内部项目融资模型，其中配偶之间的道德风险摩擦和女性的资产控制是主要成分。正如模型预测的那样，数据显示家庭资产积累非单调地依赖于女性的资产控制。结果表明不存在多重均衡贫困陷阱，但确实表明外生的负面冲击会触发夫妻双方都在场的家庭内的资产聚集。然而，这种弹性机制在女性户主家庭中并不存在，因为这些家庭在女性财富控制和资产创造之间具有单调关系。因此，我们认为支持妇女的政策