In a three-stage game, we revisit the non-cooperative coalition approaches into international environmental agreements by tackling a fundamental design flaw in these approaches. We show how a treaty can effectively remove the free-riding problem from its roots by farsightedly choosing its members’ emissions. We prove that under this approach, the grand coalition is a self-enforcing equilibrium. We will argue how the modified timing of the coalition game suggested in this article is more realistic and consistent with real-world practices. Another advantage of the farsighted rule is its simplicity and applicability to all coalition game settings, regardless of whether agents are homogeneous or heterogeneous.

在一个三阶段博弈中，我们通过解决这些方法中的基本设计缺陷，重新审视国际环境协议中的非合作联盟方法。我们展示了一项条约如何通过有远见地选择其成员的排放量来有效地消除其根源上的搭便车问题。我们证明，在这种方法下，大联盟是一个自我执行的均衡。我们将讨论本文中建议的联盟博弈的修改时机如何更加现实并与现实世界的实践保持一致。有远见的规则的另一个优点是它的简单性和适用于所有联盟博弈设置，无论代理是同质的还是异质的。