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Banking Union's accountability system in practice: A health check-up to Europe's financial heart
European Law Journal  ( IF 1.396 ) Pub Date : 2022-04-12 , DOI: 10.1111/eulj.12404
Marco Lamandini , David Ramos Muñoz

The Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) and Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) form the Banking Union, which comprises EU authorities (ECB and SRB) and national authorities (NCAs and NRAs) with vast powers. Although crucial for its legitimacy, the Banking Union’s accountability is flawed, and not for the (stereo)typical reasons: accountability is a visible concept in SSM and SRM regulations, and political, administrative and judicial bodies are knowledgeable, engaged and thorough. Rather, this article posits that the SSM and SRM work very well because the legislature focused on practical details such as information flows, planning and continuity and coordination, while there has been no comparable effort to ensure the functioning of accountability tools. The result is a “system” characterised by limited access to crucial information, lack of continuity, and uncoordinated functioning. Changing this should not be hard but requires replacing blanket criticism and stereotypical views with greater attention to detail.

中文翻译:

银行联盟问责制的实践:对欧洲金融心脏的健康检查

单一监管机制(SSM)和单一决议机制(SRM)组成了银行业联盟,该联盟由拥有巨大权力的欧盟当局(欧洲央行和SRB)和国家当局(NCA和NRA)组成。尽管银行联盟的合法性至关重要,但它的问责制却存在缺陷,而且并非出于(刻板的)典型原因:问责制是 SSM 和 SRM 法规中的一个明显概念,政治、行政和司法机构知识渊博、积极参与且彻底。相反,本文认为 SSM 和 SRM 运作良好,因为立法机构专注于信息流、规划、连续性和协调等实际细节,而没有做出类似的努力来确保问责工具的运作。结果是一个“系统”,其特征是对关键信息的访问受到限制,缺乏连续性和不协调的运作。改变这一点应该不难,但需要更多地关注细节,取代笼统的批评和陈规定型观点。
更新日期:2022-04-12
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