This paper provides necessary conditions of an equilibrium for a first-price auction with resale when one of the two bidders participating in the auction is risk averse and the other bidder is risk neutral. We show that the risk averse bidder bids more aggressively than the risk neutral bidder. If the probability distributions are identical, then the risk averse bidder wins the auction more often than the risk neutral bidder. We also construct an example to show that, if the probability distributions are non-identical, then “bid symmetrization” may hold.

中文翻译：

---

具有转售和风险规避的拍卖

当参与拍卖的两个投标人中的一个是风险厌恶者而另一个投标人是风险中性时，本文提供了具有转售的首价拍卖均衡的必要条件。我们表明，风险厌恶投标人比风险中性投标人更积极地投标。如果概率分布相同，则风险厌恶投标人比风险中性投标人更常赢得拍卖。我们还构建了一个示例来表明，如果概率分布不相同，则“出价对称化”可能成立。