A lack of consensus persists as to whom exactly the dialogues of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations are between: Wittgenstein and an interlocutor? Or perhaps a variety of interlocutors, none of whom can be identified with Wittgenstein himself? I argue here that this lack of consensus is possibly due to an ambiguity in the ordinary concept of “talking to oneself,” and that a new concept of “talking to oneself” appropriate to Wittgenstein's dialogues is needed to properly understand them. Wittgenstein is talking to himself—but he is doing so in the way we talk to other people.

中文翻译：

---

维特根斯坦自言自语的新方式

关于维特根斯坦《哲学研究》的对话到底是在谁之间，一直缺乏共识：维特根斯坦和对话者？或者也许是各种各样的对话者，他们中没有一个是维特根斯坦本人？我在此论证，这种共识的缺乏可能是由于“自言自语”的普通概念含糊不清，需要一个适合维特根斯坦对话的新概念“自言自语”才能正确理解它们。维特根斯坦是在自言自语——但他是以我们与他人交谈的方式进行的。