Do agency heads’ public profiles enhance the performance of bureaucratic agencies? Existing studies of public administration emphasize the role of public information in managing government performance. However, whether public attention to agency heads affects the performance of their agencies is largely understudied. Using a unique dataset of agency heads’ public profiles in South Korea, we predict that such profiles have a positive impact on their agencies’ performance. Although agency heads are not held accountable directly to citizens, close public attention to agency heads’ activities may function as an indirect mechanism of accountability and of improving their organizations’ performance. Our analysis supports our prediction and further suggests that an agency head’s high public profile is a benefit, particularly in more salient policy areas where “going public” is more effective for their policy reforms. Our findings have clear implications: the importance of agency heads’ unconventional roles for effective agency management, responding to rapidly changing external environments.

机构负责人的公开资料是否提高了官僚机构的绩效？现有的公共行政研究强调公共信息在管理政府绩效中的作用。然而，公众对机构负责人的关注是否会影响其机构的绩效在很大程度上还没有得到充分研究。使用韩国机构负责人公开资料的独特数据集，我们预测此类资料对其机构的绩效产生积极影响。尽管机构负责人不直接对公民负责，但公众对机构负责人活动的密切关注可能起到间接问责机制和改善其组织绩效的作用。我们的分析支持我们的预测，并进一步表明机构负责人的高公众形象是一种好处，特别是在更为突出的政策领域，“上市”对其政策改革更为有效。我们的研究结果具有明确的含义：机构负责人的非常规角色对于有效的机构管理、应对快速变化的外部环境的重要性。