For Kant, the moral law is the causal law of freedom. However, it is not an explanatory causal law. It is instead a causal law of imputation: it is a law according to which we can be held responsible for the actions the law declares necessary; that is, it is a law according to which we can be considered the causes of whether or not we act lawfully. In this way, the moral law (if valid) makes possible a kind of causality that is a “third thing” between natural necessity and blind chance. This essay traces the origins of this view to the Antinomy of Pure Reason of the first Critique and shows how it is refined in Kant’s foundational texts in practical philosophy of the 1780s (the Groundwork and second Critique) and in his reflections on the nature of human evil from the 1790s (especially in Part One of the Religion).

中文翻译：

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康德关于作为自由因果律的道德律

对于康德来说，道德法则是自由的因果法则。然而，它不是一个解释性的因果律。相反，它是一个因果律归责的：这是一项法律，根据该法律，我们可以对法律宣布的必要行为负责；也就是说，它是一个法律，我们可以根据它来考虑的原因无论我们是否合法行事。这样，道德法则（如果有效）使一种因果关系成为可能，这种因果关系是自然必然性和盲目机会之间的“第三件事”。本文将这种观点的起源追溯到第一部《纯粹理性的二律背反》。批判并展示了它是如何在康德 1780 年代实践哲学的基础文本中得到提炼的（基础工作第二个批判) 以及他对 1790 年代人类邪恶本质的反思（尤其是在第一部分）宗教）。