ABSTRACT

In this article, I will argue that while Marion’s criticism of Heidegger’s project of fundamental ontology is in many ways sound, Marion remains bound to the conceptual opposition that existential phenomenology has successfully overcome. Namely, I will argue that Marion remains dependent upon the transcendental dilemma according to which we must rely on the strict differentiation between explanans and explanandum. Marion sees no way of departing from Heidegger’s project other than reversing the order of explanation and switching the places of the explanans and explanandum, which means that phenomena start appearing as explanans. I will demonstrate how existential phenomenology has overcome this conceptual dilemma, and then I will argue that we could make a much better account of saturated phenomena, if we ground our insights in the idea of being-in-the-world.

摘要

在本文中，我将论证，尽管马里昂对海德格尔基础本体论计划的批评在许多方面是合理的，但马里昂仍然受制于存在主义现象学已成功克服的概念对立。即，我将争辩说，马里昂仍然依赖于先验困境，根据该困境，我们必须依赖于解释者和解释者之间的严格区分。马里昂认为，除了颠倒解释的顺序，调换外显子和外显子的位置，这意味着现象开始以外显子的形式出现外，马里昂没有办法脱离海德格尔的计划。我将展示存在现象学如何克服这一概念困境，然后我将论证我们可以更好地解释饱和现象，