A growing body of literature in experimental economics examines how cognitive ability affects cooperation in social dilemma settings. We contribute to the existing literature by studying this relationship in a more complex and strategic environment when the number of partners increases in an infinitely repeated public goods game. We designed four treatments with different continuation probability under two conditions: whether cooperation can be sustained as risk dominance or not. We asked participants to decide whether to cooperate in every period in the first five rounds. They were further asked to decide if they should elicit their strategy at the beginning of each super game using the strategy method in the last five rounds. We found that participants with greater cognitive abilities cooperated more (less) when cooperation could (not) be sustained as risk dominance. A similar trend was observed in the frequency of fully cooperative strategies. We also found that participants with greater cognitive abilities employed lenient and forgiving strategies more frequently when the continuation probability was far higher than the risk dominant threshold level.

越来越多的实验经济学文献研究了认知能力如何影响社会困境环境中的合作。当无限重复的公共产品博弈中合作伙伴的数量增加时，我们通过在更复杂和更具战略性的环境中研究这种关系来为现有文献做出贡献。我们在两个条件下设计了四种具有不同持续概率的治疗方法：合作是否可以作为风险优势持续存在。我们要求参与者决定是否在前五轮的每个阶段进行合作。他们进一步被要求决定是否应该在每场超级比赛开始时使用最后五轮的策略方法来引出他们的策略。我们发现，当合作可以（不）作为风险优势持续存在时，具有更高认知能力的参与者合作更多（更少）。在完全合作策略的频率上也观察到了类似的趋势。我们还发现，当持续概率远高于风险主导阈值水平时，认知能力更强的参与者更频繁地采用宽大和宽恕的策略。