Much controversy has arisen in recent years about the relation between legal philosophy and cognitive science, with some authors announcing a revolution brought about in law by the advances in the scientific study of cognition. At the same time, pessimistic declarations were made, and the significance of cognitive science for law and legal philosophy was denied. In this paper I argue that representatives of legal philosophy are now facing a “tension problem” which comes as a consequence of the following beliefs: that legal philosophy should be naturalized; that contemporary cognitive science is not a source of knowledge proper, that is, a source of naturalization; and that contemporary cognitive science is the best available source of knowledge about cognitive mechanisms. To illustrate the significance of the problem, a case study is presented that concerns research devoted to abstract concepts and its significance for the issues analyzed by legal philosophers, such as legal concepts and legal cognition. More general remarks about the manner of naturalizing jurisprudence are also presented.

中文翻译：

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法律哲学与认知科学之间的张力问题

近年来，关于法哲学与认知科学之间的关系引起了很多争论，一些作者宣布，认知科学研究的进步带来了一场法律革命。与此同时，人们发表了悲观的声明，否认认知科学对法律和法哲学的意义。在本文中，我认为法哲学的代表们现在面临着一个“张力问题”，这是由于以下信念造成的：法哲学应该自然化；当代认知科学不是知识的源泉，即归化的源泉；并且当代认知科学是关于认知机制的最佳可用知识来源。为了说明问题的重要性，提出了一个案例研究，该研究涉及致力于抽象概念的研究及其对法律哲学家分析的问题的意义，例如法律概念和法律认知。还提出了关于法理学归化方式的更一般性的评论。