The United Nations (UN) introduced multiparty elections to Cambodia in 1993 in the hope of bringing about democracy in that country. Ironically, the two-and-a-half decades of uninterrupted elections have led to an ever-more authoritarian government under Prime Minister Hun Sen and the Cambodian People's Party (CPP). Authoritarianism under the single-dominant party system began in 1997, but has intensified since 2017 with the ban on the leading opposition party. While concurring that repetitive elections have consolidated authoritarianism, this paper argues that elections are not merely tools that authoritarian leaders deploy to hold on to power. Elections are arguably mechanisms that have compelled the CPP to offer several extraordinary economic concessions since 2013; this is the first argument of the paper. The developments have created a win-win scenario for the rulers and the ruled—the authoritarian leaders prolong their rule, and the masses have more disposable income, among various benefits. The second argument is that such policy concessions are made only when the ruling party senses critical challenges from the opposition and voters. This paper contributes to the literature arguing that multiparty elections in electoral authoritarian regimes extract economic policy concessions.

中文翻译：

---

柬埔寨多次多党选举：强化威权主义却惠及大众

联合国（UN）于 1993 年在柬埔寨引入多党选举，希望在该国实现民主。具有讽刺意味的是，连续两年半的选举导致了洪森首相和柬埔寨人民党（CPP）领导下的越来越专制的政府。一党制下的威权主义始于 1997 年，但自 2017 年以来随着主要反对党被取缔而愈演愈烈。虽然同意重复的选举巩固了威权主义，但本文认为，选举不仅仅是威权领导人用来保持权力的工具。自 2013 年以来，选举可以说是迫使 CPP 提供几项非凡的经济让步的机制；这是论文的第一个论点。这些事态发展为统治者和被统治者创造了双赢的局面——威权领导人延长他们的统治，群众有更多的可支配收入，以及各种好处。第二个论点是，只有当执政党感受到反对派和选民的重大挑战时，才会做出这样的政策让步。本文有助于文献论证选举威权政权中的多党选举会导致经济政策让步。