We review recent research into how firms navigate four complex decisions in corporate takeovers: ( a) deal initiation, ( b) pre-offer toehold acquisition, ( c) the initial (public) offer price, and ( d) the payment method. We focus the evidence on public targets and the theory on first-price or English (ascending-price) auctions with two competing bidders and a single (pivotal) seller. The evidence shows that nearly half of bids are initiated by the target (not a bidder). Notwithstanding the large offer premiums, only a small fraction of bidders acquire a target toehold prior to bidding. The first bid rarely attracts rival bidders, suggesting effective competition deterrence. Bid jumps are high, as predicted when bidding costs are large. Pre-bid stock price run-ups reflect rational market deal anticipation and are understood as such by the deal negotiators. Bidders select stock payment when concerned with adverse selection on the target side of the deal.

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收购拍卖中的战略决策：近期发展

我们回顾了最近关于公司如何在公司收购中应对四个复杂决策的研究：(a) 交易启动，(b) 要约前立足点收购，(c) 初始（公开）要约价格，以及 (d) 支付方式。我们将证据集中在公共目标上，以及关于两个竞争竞标者和一个（关键）卖家的第一价或英式（升价）拍卖的理论。证据表明，近一半的投标是由目标公司（而非投标人）发起的。尽管要约溢价很高，但只有一小部分投标人在投标前获得了目标立足点。第一次投标很少吸引竞争对手，这表明有效的竞争威慑。正如出价成本很高时所预测的那样，出价跳跃很高。投标前股价上涨反映了市场对交易的理性预期，交易谈判者也这样理解。当涉及交易目标方的逆向选择时，投标人选择股票支付。