Short-term debt that can serve as a medium of exchange is designed to be information insensitive. No one should be tempted to acquire private information to gain an informational advantage in trading that could destabilize the value of the debt. Short-term debt minimizes the incentive to acquire information among all securities of equal value backed by the same underlying asset. Moreover, backing short-term debt with debt (i.e., using debt as collateral) minimizes information sensitivity across all types of collateral with equal value. These features are consistent with financial crises occurring periodically. In the information view adopted here, a financial crisis can occur when the collateral backing the short-term debt is thought to have lost enough value to raise doubts among the traders that some may acquire private information. In a crisis, there is a shift from information-insensitive to information-sensitive debt.

中文翻译：

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金融危机的信息观

可以作为交换媒介的短期债务被设计为对信息不敏感。任何人都不应试图获取私人信息以在交易中获得可能破坏债务价值的信息优势。短期债务最大限度地减少了从相同标的资产支持的所有等值证券中获取信息的动机。此外，用债务支持短期债务（即使用债务作为抵押品）可以最大限度地降低所有类型等值抵押品的信息敏感性。这些特征与周期性发生的金融危机是一致的。在这里采用的信息观点中，当支持短期债务的抵押品被认为已经失去了足够的价值以引起交易者对某些人可能获得私人信息的怀疑时，就会发生金融危机。在危机中，