One of the public’s popular beliefs about politics is that politicians engage in rent-seeking behaviors, such as accumulating property, using their political power. By applying a regression discontinuity design, this study examines whether members of the National Assembly of South Korea gained assets during three elective terms (2004–2008, 2008–2012, and 2012–2016). The results contradict the public’s claim. In general, there is minimal evidence that election winners accumulate more assets than runners-up. And observing the winners’ premium for newly elected politicians in the 2012–2016 term, I find that it is related to a political support fund, which is a legitimate channel for politicians’ funding. The results suggest that an information disclosure policy can play a pivotal role in restricting politicians’ rent-seeking behaviors.

中文翻译：

---

审视韩国政客的财富积累

公众对政治的普遍看法之一是，政客利用他们的政治权力从事寻租行为，例如积累财产。通过应用回归不连续设计，本研究检验了韩国国民议会成员是否在三个选举任期（2004-2008 年、2008-2012 年和 2012-2016 年）期间获得了资产。结果与公众的说法相矛盾。一般来说，几乎没有证据表明选举获胜者比亚军积累了更多的资产。And observing the winners' premium for newly elected politicians in the 2012–2016 term, I find that it is related to a political support fund, which is a legitimate channel for politicians' funding. 结果表明，信息披露政策可以在限制政客的寻租行为方面发挥关键作用。