ABSTRACT The extinction of a species can provoke deep feelings of sadness, injustice, compassion and empathy for the individuals lost. In this paper we argue that law, as a governance institution, does not allow decision-makers the use of emotions such as compassion or empathy, when making decisions relevant to the possible extinction of species, despite evidence to suggest that such emotions elevate the importance of moral concerns, and so may be utilised to halt the extinction process. Further, we argue that law can impact our ability to feel compassion and empathy for species heading towards extinction, as it creates a narrative of apathy. This is particularly exacerbated when it comes to the potential extinction of invertebrates, whose needs and interests are often already subject to people’s negative emotional pre-dispositions. By analysing the recent legal decisions surrounding the approval of the Yeelirrie Uranium mine in Western Australia, we highlight the nature of this problem and what it means for the conservation of invertebrate species, and argue that environmental law’s commitment to utilitarian and rational traditions will continue to challenge how we react to, and allow, the extinction of invertebrate.

中文翻译：

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无脊椎动物的灭绝、规律和情绪化思考

摘要 一个物种的灭绝会激起对失去的个体的深深的悲伤、不公正、同情和同情。在本文中，我们认为法律作为一种治理机构，在做出与物种可能灭绝相关的决策时，不允许决策者使用同情或同理心等情感，尽管有证据表明这种情感会提高重要性。道德问题，因此可以用来阻止灭绝过程。此外，我们认为法律会影响我们对濒临灭绝的物种产生同情和同情的能力，因为它创造了一种冷漠的叙述。当涉及到无脊椎动物的潜在灭绝时，这种情况尤为严重，因为无脊椎动物的需求和利益往往已经受到人们消极情绪倾向的影响。