In this paper, I defend an epistemic requirement on fitting hopes and worries: it is fitting to hope or to worry that p only if one’s epistemic position makes it rational to suspend judgment as to whether p. This view, unlike prominent alternatives, is ecumenical; it retains its plausibility against a variety of different background views of epistemology. It also has other important theoretical virtues: it is illuminating, elegant, and extensionally adequate. Fallibilists about knowledge have special reason to be friendly to my view; it can help them explain why it can be unfitting to hold on to hope and worry in the face of overwhelming evidence, and it can also help them explain the sense in which knowledge that p and hope that –p are in tension with one another.

在本文中，我为拟合希望和担忧的认知要求辩护：只有当一个人的认知立场使得暂停判断 p 是否是合理的时，希望或担心p才是合适的。这种观点与其他著名的观点不同，是普世的。对于认识论的各种不同背景观点，它保留了它的合理性。它还具有其他重要的理论优点：它具有启发性、优雅和外延充分。关于知识的易错论者有特殊的理由对我的观点持友好态度；它可以帮助他们解释为什么在压倒性的证据面前坚持希望和担心是不合适的，它还可以帮助他们解释知识p和希望的意义——p彼此处于紧张状态。