Fintech firms, once seen as ‘disruptors’ of the traditional banking world, are now increasingly seen as attractive partners for established financial institutions. Such partnership agreements come in different forms and contexts, but most share the goals of outsourcing key banking functions and facilitating market entry for new market players while overcoming relatively tough regulatory hurdles. Yet such arrangements, while generally to be welcomed, pose a number of regulatory problems, in particular concerning the effective supervision of fintechs that operate outside of the direct purview of regulatory authorities. Questions of enforcement and effective supervision emerge, which may ultimately result in problems regarding market stability and systemic risk. Regulatory sandboxes represent one attempt to address these problems but may fail to do so and are often ineffective or unavailable. Other similar solutions, such as fintech charters and umbrella firms, may help but, similarly, provide an imperfect solution. Against this backdrop, we make the case for a ‘mentorship regime’, which provides for a reliable regulatory framework for partnership agreements between fintech firms and established banks. This would allow for a de facto ‘private sandbox’ where experienced firms could mentor new startups and help them to cope with a complex regulatory process. At the same time, a state-backed mentorship plan would clear up the allocation of responsibilities, supervision competences, and liability questions and thus overcome problems of arbitrage and abuse. Ultimately, a mentorship regime may show the way to a new and more reliable future system of banking, making the well-stablished contractual practice of outsourcing banking services more reliable.

中文翻译：

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银行与金融科技的合作伙伴关系、外包安排和指导制度的案例

金融科技公司曾经被视为传统银行业的“颠覆者”，现在越来越多地被视为老牌金融机构的有吸引力的合作伙伴。此类合作协议有不同的形式和背景，但大多数都具有外包关键银行职能和促进新市场参与者进入市场的目标，同时克服相对严峻的监管障碍。然而，这种安排虽然普遍受到欢迎，但也带来了许多监管问题，特别是在监管机构直接权限之外运营的金融科技的有效监管方面。执法和有效监管问题浮出水面，最终可能导致市场稳定性和系统性风险问题。监管沙箱代表了解决这些问题的一种尝试，但可能无法做到这一点，并且通常无效或不可用。其他类似的解决方案，例如金融科技章程和伞式公司，可能会有所帮助，但同样提供了一个不完美的解决方案。在这种背景下，我们提出了“指导制度”的理由，该制度为金融科技公司和老牌银行之间的合作协议提供了可靠的监管框架。这将允许一个事实上的“私人沙箱”，经验丰富的公司可以指导新的初创公司并帮助他们应对复杂的监管过程。同时，国家支持的导师计划将明确责任分配、监督能力和责任问题，从而克服套利和滥用问题。最终，