It has been begrudgingly presumed that Italy's bonds governed by New York law will remain untouched during an Italian debt restructuring as a result of an expectation that holdout creditors will successfully challenge any such restructuring attempt. However, this presumption was based on the flawed belief, based in a discrepancy between the language contained in the bond prospectus and the underlying indenture, that the bonds contain creditor-friendly pari passu language. As the controlling legal instrument – the indenture – instead uses the version of the pari passu clause that is much less creditor-friendly, Italy will be able to restructure the bonds with a dramatically reduced threat of holdout creditor litigation based on that clause. However, this discrepancy between the prospectus and the indenture makes Italy vulnerable to securities fraud claims by its creditors. Additionally, the presence of a similar variation in the pari passu clause in some of Venezuela’s bonds lends concern about the pervasiveness of the problem for sovereign debt issuances.

中文翻译：

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重组意大利的纽约法律债券

人们不情愿地推测，意大利受纽约法律管辖的债券在意大利债务重组期间将保持不变，因为预期持股债权人将成功挑战任何此类重组尝试。然而，这一推定是基于一种有缺陷的信念，即债券招股说明书中包含的语言与基础契约之间存在差异，即债券包含有利于债权人的同等使用语言。由于控制性法律工具——契约——改为使用对债权人不太友好的同等权益条款版本，意大利将能够重组债券，大大减少基于该条款的拒绝债权人诉讼的威胁。然而，招股说明书和契约之间的这种差异使意大利容易受到债权人的证券欺诈索赔。此外，委内瑞拉部分债券的同等权益条款也存在类似变化，这令人担忧主权债务发行问题的普遍性。