PurposeThis paper aims to examine the role of outside peacekeepers in a bilateral conflict.Design/methodology/approachThe authors build upon a trade theoretic framework by incorporating disruptions due to war, which could affect directly the return to investment, both domestic and foreign, and by introducing explicitly peacekeeping forces into the model. Two countries are engaged in a war, with the purpose of capturing capital. A third country plays a dual role: it is the source of investments in the warring countries, and it deploys soldiers on ground for peacekeeping purposes. The authors consider the cases where the levels of foreign investments are exogenous and when they are endogenously determined by free mobility conditions. In the worst case, they find that foreign investment reduces conflict. In the case of endogenous foreign investments, they examine the effect of multilateral agreements where the two warring countries reduce their number of soldiers and the third increases the number of peacekeepers.FindingsThe authors find that the reform benefits all three countries and increases the level of foreign investments. They consider the cases of exogenous and endogenous foreign direct investment (FDI). In the first case, the authors examine the effect of an exogenous increase in FDI on the war equilibrium and find that it reduces the employment of soldiers in the warring countries and increases the size of the peacekeeping force. They also find that the first-best level of peacekeeping is larger than the equilibrium level. When FDI is endogenous, starting from the initial war equilibrium, they also examine the effect of a multilateral agreement in which the size of the peacekeeping force is increased by the third country and the two warring countries agree to reduce their war efforts. The authors find that the reform makes all three countries better off and increases the level of FDI.Originality/valueThe paper uses a theoretical model with third-party interventions in a bilateral war. It intends to shed light on some of the missing economic implications of peacekeeping. The paper introduces explicitly peacekeeping forces into the analysis and introduces a factor that represents a disruption to return on investment in both warring countries. The third country has a dual role; it provides investments in the warring countries and deploys soldiers for peacekeeping. Peacekeeping reduces the disruption mentioned above and affects the employment of soldiers by the warring countries. The authors find that a multilateral agreement in which the two warring countries reduce their war efforts and the third party increases its peacekeeping force can increase welfare in all three countries.

中文翻译：

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在与外国投资冲突的模式中维持和平

目的本文旨在研究外部维和人员在双边冲突中的作用。设计/方法/方法作者建立在贸易理论框架的基础上，将战争造成的破坏纳入其中，这可能直接影响国内和国外的投资回报，并通过在模型中明确引入维和部队。两国正在进行一场战争，目的是为了夺取资本。第三国扮演着双重角色：它是交战国的投资来源，并为维持和平目的在地面部署士兵。作者考虑了外国投资水平是外生的以及由自由流动条件内生决定的情况。在最坏的情况下，他们发现外国投资可以减少冲突。就内生性外国投资而言，他们研究了多边协议的效果，其中两个交战国减少了士兵人数，第三个增加了维和人员的人数。研究结果作者发现，改革对所有三个国家都有利，并提高了外国投资水平。他们考虑了外生和内生外国直接投资 (FDI) 的案例。在第一种情况下，作者考察了外生直接投资增加对战争平衡的影响，发现它减少了交战国士兵的就业并增加了维和部队的规模。他们还发现维和的最优水平大于均衡水平。当 FDI 是内生的，从最初的战争均衡开始，他们还研究了一项多边协议的效果，在该协议中，第三国增加了维和部队的规模，两个交战国同意减少他们的战争努力。作者发现，改革使所有三个国家都变得更好，并提高了 FDI 水平。原创性/价值本文使用了第三方干预双边战争的理论模型。它旨在阐明维和行动中一些缺失的经济影响。该文件在分析中明确引入了维和部队，并引入了一个代表两个交战国家投资回报中断的因素。第三国具有双重作用；它为交战国家提供投资，并为维持和平部署士兵。维和减少了上述干扰，影响了交战国士兵的就业。作者发现，一项多边协议，其中两个交战国减少战争努力，第三方增加其维和部队，可以增加所有三个国家的福利。