In professional boxing, a higher-ranked boxer chooses his opponent among challengers varying in popularity and strength. We build a three-stage model of a professional boxing fight between the chooser and a challenger to examine the strategic incentives of a chooser in sharing the purse and exerting a proper level of effort. More importantly, we endogenize the choice of the opponent and the purse to be generated. We found that an older chooser who is ready to cash in his reputation tends to choose a stronger opponent with little effort, while a young rising “star” prefers a match against weaker opponents.

中文翻译：

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职业拳击手的激励与战略行为

在职业拳击比赛中，排名较高的拳击手在人气和实力各不相同的挑战者中选择对手。我们建立了选择者和挑战者之间职业拳击比赛的三阶段模型，以检验选择者分享钱包和发挥适当努力水平的战略动机。更重要的是，我们将对手的选择和要生成的钱包内生化。我们发现，准备兑现声誉的年长选择者倾向于毫不费力地选择更强的对手，而年轻的“新星”则更喜欢与较弱的对手进行比赛。