Purpose

This paper aims to analyze the inhibitory effect of non-controlling shareholders governance mechanism on the retention of self-interest management, which provides theoretical support and practical basis for standardizing the control transfer behavior of listed companies and improving the governance mechanism of non-controlling shareholders.

Design/methodology/approach

Taking A-share listed companies with control transfer from 2000 to 2017 as sample, this paper investigates the strategy, path and retention consequence of the target company’s market selected top management who collude with the new controlling shareholder to avoid the risk of being taken over by control transfer.

Findings

This research explores that negative earnings management behavior may reduce the real premium of control transfer after deducting the “shell value”. The lower the real premium of control transfer after deducting the “shell value”, the higher the probability of management retention after control transfer. This paper also reveals that the real premium of control transfer after deducting the “shell value” plays complete mediation role between the negative earnings management behavior of the management and their own retention. The mediation effect of “collusion and price reduction” in the control transfer will be inversely moderated by the governance mechanism of noncontrolling shareholders including the old shareholders of the seller.

Originality/value

This paper not only constitutes a supplement to the existing literature but also provides empirical evidence for standardizing the control transfer behavior of listed companies, and making good use of the old shareholders of the seller to improve corporate governance and alleviate agency conflict after control transfer.

中文翻译：

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“卖方”的控制权转移与老股东治理：谁阻碍了管理层的保留？

目的

本文旨在分析非控股股东治理机制对自身利益管理保留的抑制作用，为规范上市公司控制权转移行为、完善非控股股东治理机制提供理论支持和实践依据。 .

设计/方法/方法

以2000年至2017年控制权转移的A股上市公司为样本，考察目标公司市场选拔高管与新控股股东串通的策略、路径及留任后果，以避免被新控股股东接手风险。控制转移。

发现

本研究探讨了负盈余管理行为可能会降低扣除“壳值”后的控制权转让的实际溢价。扣除“壳值”后的实际控制权转让溢价越低，控制权转让后管理层保留的概率越高。本文还揭示了扣除“壳值”后的实际控制权转让溢价在管理层的负盈余管理行为与其自身保留之间起到了完全的中介作用。控制权转让中“合谋降价”的中介效应会受到包括卖方老股东在内的非控股股东治理机制的反向调节。

原创性/价值

本文不仅是对现有文献的补充，而且为规范上市公司控制权转让行为，利用好卖方老股东改善公司治理，缓解控制权转让后的代理冲突提供了实证依据。