Transaction cost economics (TCE) holds that multinational corporations (MNCs) should select governance modes based on associated transactional hazards. However, MNCs often adopt theoretically misaligned governance modes. Applying a prospect theory (PT) perspective, we use the context of business-process offshoring to explore why firms choose misaligned governance modes. We argue that theoretically misaligned governance modes are regarded as riskier than aligned governance modes, and we suggest that prior experiences of failure in an international context—especially in business functions that are relevant for the internationalization of a firm—prompt decision-makers to choose theoretically misaligned governance modes. We enhance discussions on governance-mode decisions with important behavioral perspectives on how such decisions materialize.

中文翻译：

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离岸业务职能时选择错位的治理模式：前景理论视角

交易成本经济学 (TCE) 认为跨国公司 (MNC) 应根据相关的交易风险选择治理模式。然而，跨国公司往往采用理论上错位的治理模式。应用前景理论 (PT) 的观点，我们使用业务流程离岸外包的背景来探索为什么公司选择错位的治理模式。我们认为，理论上错位的治理模式被认为比对齐的治理模式风险更大，我们建议在国际背景下的先前失败经验——尤其是在与公司国际化相关的业务职能方面——促使决策者在理论上做出选择错位的治理模式。我们加强了对治理模式决策的讨论，并从重要的行为角度探讨了此类决策如何实现。