Abstract Conventional wisdom holds that party polarization leads to legislative gridlock, which in turn disables congressional oversight of agencies and thus erodes their constitutional legitimacy and democratic accountability. At the root of this argument is an empirical claim that higher levels of polarization materially reduce legislative productivity as measured by the number of laws passed or the number of issues on the legislative agenda addressed by those laws, both of which are negatively associated with party polarization. By focusing on the content of statutes passed rather than their number, this essay shows that in the era of party polarization and divided government, Congress has actually 1) enacted an ever growing volume of significant regulatory policy (packaged into fewer laws); 2) increasingly employed implementation designs intended to limit bureaucratic and presidential power; and 3) legislated regulatory policy substance in greater detail (reducing bureaucratic discretion) when relying on litigation and courts as a supplement or alternative to bureaucracy. This essay thereby complicates, both empirically and normatively, the relationship between Congress and administrative power in the era of party polarization and divided government.

中文翻译：

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两极分化下的立法能力与行政权力

摘要 传统观点认为，政党两极分化导致立法僵局，进而削弱国会对机构的监督，从而削弱其宪法合法性和民主问责制。这一论点的根源是一种经验主张，即更高水平的两极分化会大大降低立法生产力，以通过的法律数量或这些法律解决的立法议程上的问题数量来衡量，这两者都与政党两极分化负相关. 通过关注通过的法规的内容而不是数量，本文表明，在党的两极分化和政府分裂的时代，国会实际上 1) 制定了数量不断增加的重要监管政策（打包成更少的法律）；2) 越来越多地采用旨在限制官僚和总统权力的实施设计；3) 当依靠诉讼和法院作为官僚机构的补充或替代时，更详细地立法监管政策内容（减少官僚自由裁量权）。因此，本文在实证和规范上复杂化了政党两极分化和政府分裂时代国会与行政权力之间的关系。