Abstract The modern regulatory state–and the field of administrative law that studies it–is in need of “deconstruction.” That does not mean that it should be dismantled entirely. This essay does not embrace the reformers' fixation on courts as the bulwark against agency overreach. Rather, this essay develops the concept of bureaucracy beyond judicial review: not only agency actions that statute or judicial doctrine precludes from judicial review, but also agency actions that are technically subject to judicial review yet effectively insulated from it. Appreciating the phenomenon of bureaucracy beyond judicial review should encourage us to rethink theories and doctrines in administrative law. If judicial review provides no safeguard against potential abuses of power in most regulatory activities, we must turn to other mechanisms. All three branches of the federal government must play their roles, as should civil society and the agencies themselves.

中文翻译：

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超越司法审查限制官僚主义

摘要 现代监管国家——以及研究它的行政法领域——需要“解构”。这并不意味着它应该被完全拆除。本文不接受改革者对法院的执着，将其视为反对机构过度扩张的堡垒。相反，本文发展了司法审查之外的官僚主义概念：不仅是法规或司法学说排除在司法审查之外的机构行为，而且还包括在技术上受司法审查但实际上与之隔离的机构行为。欣赏司法审查之外的官僚主义现象应该鼓励我们重新思考行政法的理论和学说。如果司法审查无法在大多数监管活动中防止潜在的权力滥用，我们就必须求助于其他机制。