specifically British approach to war, one rooted in her particular geography, culture, and strategy. This notion of a ‘British way in warfare’ has most commonly been associated with theorists of maritime warfare, or at least those who viewed seapower as fundamental to British strategic thought. In a series of much less well-known contributions, Callwell also intervened in this area, promulgating a series of ideas about amphibious warfare and the inter-relationship between naval and military forces. Whittingham rightly describes his work in this area as original, and as worthy of consideration by those who locate the origins of thinking about ‘joint’ warfare primarily in the work of those concerned with maritime conflict. Seapower played a larger role in contemporary military thought than is often allowed, a reality which Callwell himself embodied. One of the features of Callwell’s career that makes him such a rich subject for study is that he straddled the two spheres of military theory, and the formation of strategy in practice. Whittingham integrates these strands subtly and effectively throughout the book, illustrating how Callwell’s experience in South Africa between 1899–1902 both reflected and changed his views on the conduct of ‘small wars’. This dialectic between strategic theory and the practice of war reached its apogee in 1914–1916, when Callwell returned from voluntary retirement to serve in the War Office during the opening years of the First World War. Here he was involved in the fateful decision-making (and avoidance) that culminated in the Gallipoli campaign, a rare instance of a theorist of amphibious warfare playing a key role in the conduct of a campaign of this nature. Whittingham has produced a well-researched, lucid, and valuable account which will be of interest to a wide variety of readers interested in military affairs and strategic thought more broadly. His conclusions about Callwell are considered and balanced, and he highlights failings and inconsistencies alongside aspects of his subject’s work which were more insightful. The result is a readable account which will doubtless remain the key work on Callwell’s life for decades to come. Perhaps even more valuable, however, are the possibilities this work opens up for other scholarship in the area. Whittingham has demonstrated with alacrity how the study of a previously unsung figure can provide a valuable window into broader currents of military thought. Yet we lack similar treatments for a series of contemporaries such as Spenser Wilkinson and Frederick Maurice. Let us hope that Whittingham’s intervention paves the way for a wider contextualisation of the well-worn historical canon of British military thought. As he has shown, there is much to gain from such an endeavour.

中文翻译：

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书评：苦力的大战：全球冲突中的印度劳工，1914-1921 年 作者：Radhika Singha

特别是英国的战争方法，一种根植于她特定的地理、文化和战略的方法。这种“英国战争方式”的概念最常与海上战争理论家联系在一起，或者至少与那些将海权视为英国战略思想基础的人联系在一起。在一系列鲜为人知的贡献中，考威尔也介入了这一领域，发表了一系列关于两栖战争和海军与军队之间相互关系的思想。Whittingham 正确地将他在这一领域的工作描述为独创性的，并且值得那些将思考“联合”战争的起源主要来自那些关注海上冲突的人的工作的人考虑。海权在当代军事思想中发挥的作用比通常允许的要大，考威尔本人就体现了这一现实。考尔威尔的职业生涯使他成为如此丰富的研究对象的特点之一是他跨越了军事理论和实践中的战略形成两个领域。Whittingham 在整本书中巧妙而有效地整合了这些线索，说明了 Callwell 1899-1902 年间在南非的经历如何反映并改变了他对“小规模战争”的看法。战略理论与战争实践之间的这种辩证法在 1914 年至 1916 年达到了顶峰，当时考威尔在第一次世界大战开始的几年里从自愿退休中返回到陆军办公室任职。在这里，他参与了最终导致加里波利战役的决定性决策（和回避），这是一个罕见的两栖战争理论家在这种性质的战役中发挥关键作用的例子。Whittingham 撰写了一篇经过充分研究、清晰且有价值的叙述，这将引起对军事事务和更广泛的战略思想感兴趣的各种读者的兴趣。他对 Callwell 的结论经过深思熟虑和平衡，他强调了失败和不一致以及他的主题工作中更有洞察力的方面。结果是一个可读的帐户，毫无疑问，这将是未来几十年 Callwell 生活的关键工作。然而，也许更有价值的是这项工作为该领域的其他学术研究开辟了可能性。惠廷厄姆已经敏捷地证明了对一个以前不为人知的人物的研究如何可以为更广泛的军事思想潮流提供宝贵的窗口。然而，对于 Spenser Wilkinson 和 Frederick Maurice 等一系列同时代人，我们缺乏类似的治疗方法。让我们希望，惠廷汉姆的干预为英国军事思想的陈旧历史经典的更广泛背景化铺平了道路。正如他所表明的那样，这样的努力会带来很多好处。