This paper proposes a matching-and-pricing mechanism for a drivers’ demand-reporting problem in parking-sharing programs in which owners share their private parking slots with drivers. We generate a driver-slot matching solution by a centralized assignment procedure according to the demand and supply information reported by drivers and owners, respectively, and determine truth-telling pricing by the Vickrey-Clark-Grove mechanism. We show that under the assumption that drivers do not know with certainty whether other drivers will show up to compete for the parking slots, the mechanism proposed in this paper induces drivers to truthfully report their private information of the travel plans and guarantees three other desirable properties: participation of drivers and slot owners, optimal system efficiency, and balance of the system’s budget. We further extend these results to two dynamic situations. Finally, the results of the numerical experiments based on real-world data demonstrate the performance of the mechanism.

中文翻译：

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不完善信息环境下私人停车共享计划的激励机制

本文针对停车共享项目中的司机需求报告问题提出了一种匹配和定价机制，在该项目中，业主与司机共享他们的私人停车位。我们根据司机和车主分别报告的需求和供应信息，通过集中分配程序生成司机-插槽匹配解决方案，并通过 Vickrey-Clark-Grove 机制确定真实定价。我们表明，在司机不确定其他司机是否会出现竞争停车位的假设下，本文提出的机制诱导司机如实报告他们的旅行计划的私人信息，并保证其他三个理想的属性：驾驶员和插槽所有者的参与，最佳系统效率以及系统预算的平衡。我们进一步将这些结果扩展到两种动态情况。最后，基于真实世界数据的数值实验结果证明了该机制的性能。