Abstract Bayesian game theory investigates strategic interaction of players with full awareness but incomplete information about their environment. We extend the analysis to players with incomplete awareness, who might not be able to reason about all contingencies in the first place. We develop three logical systems for knowledge, probabilistic beliefs and awareness, and characterize their axiom systems. Bayesian equilibrium is extended to games with incomplete awareness and we show that it is consistent with common prior and speculative trade, when common knowledge of rationality is violated.

中文翻译：

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知识、意识和概率信念

摘要 贝叶斯博弈论研究了具有充分意识但对其环境信息不完整的玩家之间的战略互动。我们将分析扩展到意识不完整的玩家，他们可能无法首先推理所有突发事件。我们为知识、概率信念和意识开发了三个逻辑系统，并描述了它们的公理系统。贝叶斯均衡扩展到意识不完全的博弈中，当违反理性的常识时，我们证明它与常见的先验和投机交易是一致的。